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Knowledge Sharing as a Contingency 
in the Design of  Counterterrorism 
Organizations 
Mark E. Nissen and Tara A. Leweling 
(US Naval Postgraduate School, USA)
Abstract
One of  the key institutional responses to the terrorism threat is the counter-
terrorism intelligence organization. Traditionally very bureaucratic, such 
organizations have been criticized broadly, but their organizational struc-
tures remain largely unchanged. Given the dynamic, experience-based, 
knowledge-intensive nature of  the counterterrorism task, Contingency 
Theory would suggest flatter, more flexible organization with knowledge shar-
ing as a key contingency factor. Little is known, however, about interac-
tions between organizational design and knowledge sharing. The research 
described in this article reports systematic laboratory experimentation to 
assess the structure of  counterterrorism intelligence organizations in the 
context of  alternate knowledge processes and to identify promising alter-
nate approaches to organizing. Insights into how knowledge sharing affects 
alternate organizational designs highlight a theoretical contribution, and 
empirical results have immediate practical implications.
Keywords
Contingency Theory; counterterrorism; experimentation; knowledge.
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Introduction
Although the date 11 September 2001 moves progressively into 
the past, the significance of  how the terrorism events on this date 
transformed the world remains, and life under the persistent terror-
ist threat emerging from this disruptive change has never been the 
same (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States 2004). One needs only to read the newspaper about enduring 
conflict in the Middle East, stand in long security lines at the airport, 
or see large barricades and fences in front of  government buildings 
to see apparent, sweeping, institutional changes stemming largely 
from these events. 
Alternatively, many apparently sweeping institutional changes 
involve comparatively little impact. For instance, one of  the key 
institutional responses to this threat is the counterterrorism intel-
ligence organization, which is organized and staffed to detect and 
disrupt terrorism plots before they develop into attacks. Distributed 
previously among myriad different military, government and pri-
vate organizations with little incentive to collaborate, in the US 
the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) was established in 
an attempt to coordinate counterterrorism and other institutional 
responses among dozens of  previously independent organizations 
(US Government 2009). 
Traditionally very hierarchical and bureaucratic, counterterrorism 
intelligence organizations were criticized broadly for their failure to 
disrupt the September 11 attacks, but even after DHS formation, 
their organizational structures remain largely unchanged; indeed, 
there appears to be an even larger, hierarchical and bureaucratic 
organization now than before. Given the dynamic, experience-
based, knowledge-intensive nature of  the counterterrorism task, 
organization and management theory and practice alike would sug-
gest flatter, more flexible organization with knowledge sharing (cf., infor-
mation sharing) as a key contingency factor (Birkinshaw, Nobel, and 
Ridderstrale 2002; Nissen 2005). 
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Knowledge is noted widely for the powerful and appropriate, indi-
vidual and organizational actions that it enables and guides, and 
it is distinct from organizational information: knowledge enables 
action, whereas information provides meaning and context for 
action (Nissen 2006). Further, knowledge needs to flow (e.g., across 
individuals, organizations, places, and times) through the organiza-
tion from where and when it is to where and when it is needed. This 
suggests that knowledge sharing—in addition to information shar-
ing—is important.
Indeed, many scholars (Alberts and Hayes 2003; Leweling and 
Nissen 2007) argue now that hierarchical, bureaucratic organization 
itself  represents a fundamental inhibitor to effective counterterror-
ism intelligence. Little is known, however, about interactions between 
organizational design and knowledge sharing. Moreover, adverse to 
risk and change—and comfortable with the hierarchy—government 
leaders and policy makers in this area hesitate understandably to 
make organizational structure changes without convincing evidence 
to support them (Alberts and Hayes 2006). 
The research described in this article reports systematic laboratory 
experimentation to assess the structure of  counterterrorism intelli-
gence organizations in the context of  alternate knowledge processes 
and to identify promising alternate approaches to organizing. As is 
known well, laboratory research enables investigators to assess alter-
nate organizational approaches—systematically—without changing 
or disrupting operational organizations in the field, and through 
careful design of  experiments, one can achieve considerable exter-
nal validity and generalizability of  laboratory results (Nissen and 
Buettner 2004).
Building upon Contingency Theory (Donaldson 2001), we iden-
tify flexible organizational structures with potential to transform 
counterterrorism radically. Then examining knowledge through 
a dynamic lens, we consider how knowledge sharing should affect 
counterterrorism organizational performance and learning. Using 
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an instrumented, distributed problem-solving environment for labo-
ratory experimentation, we assess how well people collaborate and 
perform counterterrorism intelligence tasks through alternate orga-
nizational approaches and knowledge processes. 
The remainder of  this article is organized into four sections begin-
ning with a focused summary of  background literature to inform 
our research hypotheses. The research design is summarized next 
and followed by results of  experimentation. Conclusions follow to 
highlight both theoretical and practical contributions through this 
empirical research, and they include a generative agenda for future 
research that offers promise to stimulate continued work in this 
important area.
Background
Contingency Theory has retained a central place in organization 
studies research for decades (Donaldson 2001), and organization 
scholars and managers understand well that no single approach to 
organizing is best in all circumstances. In most of  this research, the 
concept organizational fit has been treated in a relatively static man-
ner, with a particular organizational form (e.g., craft, engineering, see 
Perrow 1970) prescribed to fit well in a particular contingency con-
text (e.g., comprehensible and predictable, complex and stable).
However, organizational scholars (Chaharbaghi and Nugent 1994; 
Donaldson 1987; Tung 1979) have noted widely that the envi-
ronmental contexts of  many modern organizations are not static. 
Rather, organizational environments can change rapidly and unpre-
dictably, due to multiple factors such as globalization (Raynor and 
Bower 2001), technology (Rahrami 1992; Adner and Levinthal 
2002), hypercompetition (Hanssen-Bauer and Snow 1996), knowl-
edge-based innovation (Jelinek and Schoonhoven 1990), mount-
ing competition from co-evolutionary firms (Barnett and Sorenson 
2002), and others. Hence an organization that achieves good fit with 
 NISSEN & LEWELING |Knowledge Sharing as a Contingency       5
its environment at one point in time may not be able to retain such 
fit longitudinally, unless it changes structure in order to maintain 
fit—dynamically—across changing environmental conditions. 
Indeed, an organization facing a constantly changing environ-
ment could fall into a condition of  continuous (disruptive) change 
(Overholt 1997), or it might take the opposite approach, striving 
instead toward a single form that is flexible and robust to environ-
mental change (Volberda 1997). Writing specifically about counter-
ing terrorism through military and government endeavors, Alberts 
and Hayes (2003; 2006) refer to such latter organizational form in 
terms of  agility. In either case—and in most cases in between—lead-
ers’ and policy makers’ focus on static organizational fit is incom-
mensurate with the dynamics of  contingent organization demanded 
by disruptive environmental change (Donaldson 2001). Drawing 
from our discussion of  terrorism and counterterrorism above, the 
domain of  counterterrorism intelligence appears to fit well this latter 
description of  continuous (disruptive) change. This leads to our first 
research hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Agile and flexible organizational forms outperform their hierarchi-
cal and bureaucratic counterparts in the domain of  counterterrorism intelligence.
Additionally, counterterrorism intelligence is a very knowledge-
intensive task (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States 2004). This leads us to consider knowledge as an impor-
tant contingency factor also (Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal 
2001; Birkinshaw et al. 2002; Ibrahim and Nissen 2007). Indeed, the 
idea of  knowledge as a critical organizational resource is well-estab-
lished (Drucker 1995; Grant 1996; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), 
with more knowledgeable organizations described broadly as out-
performing their less knowledgeable counterparts. Further, counter-
terrorism intelligence places a particular premium on the sharing 
of  information, but the literature suggests that knowledge sharing may 
be critical in this context as well. This leads to our second research 
hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 2. Organizations manifesting greater knowledge sharing outperform 
their counterparts with less sharing in the domain of  counterterrorism intelligence.
Further, we understand well that organizations learn through 
time and experience (Inkpen and Dinur 1998; Levitt and March 
1988). Noting the balance required between organizational explo-
ration and exploitation (March 1991) and the persistent challenge 
to ambidextrous organizations working to excel simultaneously at 
both (Tushman and O’Reilly 1999), some organizations should be 
able to learn inherently faster than others. Hence organizational learn-
ing—knowledge flows that increase knowledge-based performance 
over time—emerges as another key factor to consider in terms of  
designing counterterrorism intelligence organizations. Drawing fur-
ther from Alberts and Hayes (2003; 2006) to place this discussion 
in the context of  countering terrorism through military and gov-
ernment endeavors, we find the assertion that agile organizations 
learn more quickly than their rigid counterparts do. This leads to 
our third research hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Agile and flexible organizational forms learn more quickly than 
their hierarchical and bureaucratic counterparts do in the domain of  counterter-
rorism intelligence.
Research Design
In this section, we summarize the research design used to guide this 
laboratory experiment. We employ the ELICIT1  multiplayer intel-
ligence game to examine how people working together on a counter-
terrorism, information-sharing and -processing task perform across 
different organizational configurations. We describe the task envi-
ronment, participants, measurement instruments, procedures, and 
experiment design.
1. ELICIT is an acronym for Experimental Laboratory for Investigating 
Collaboration, Information-sharing, and Trust.
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Task Environment
The task environment involves a fictitious terrorist plot, about which 
a set of  68 informational clues called factoids have been developed. 
Each factoid describes some aspect of  the plot, but none is sufficient 
to answer all of  the pertinent questions (i.e., who, what, where, when). 
The factoids are distributed among a team of  17 players in a series 
of  steps: each player receives two clues initially, followed by one after 
five minutes of  play and another after ten minutes have elapsed. The 
factoid distribution is designed so that no single player can solve the 
problem individually and so that the team of  players cannot solve 
the problem until after the final distribution. In other words, the 
players must collaborate to solve the problem.
Figure 1.  ELICIT Screenshot
Participants share and analyze factoids via ELICIT client applica-
tions on separate, networked computer workstations. Figure 1 shows 
a screenshot of  a player’s ELICIT view. Each participant has access 
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to a set of  five functions supported by the client: (1) List, (2) Post, (3) 
Pull, (4) Share, and (5) Identify. The List screen displays all factoids 
that a particular player has received. Post enables a player to have 
one or more factoids displayed on a common screen that can be 
viewed by other players. Pull represents the complement to Post, as 
a player can display on his or her List screen common information 
that has been posted. Share enables players to send factoids directly 
to one another. Finally, Identify represents the manner in which par-
ticipants communicate their “solutions” to the problem (i.e., the who, 
what, where, and when regarding a fictitious terrorist plot). Multiple 
versions of  the factoids have been created, each of  which is struc-
turally similar but distinct; that is, each version includes the same 
number and kinds of  factoids and provides a comparable task envi-
ronment, but the specifics of  each version differ and are unique. 
Participants
Participants are recruited principally from a major west coast uni-
versity offering graduate courses with bearing on organization and 
management of  counterterrorism intelligence. A total of  68 partici-
pants (mostly students but supplemented by a few faculty members) 
range in age from 22 to 62 years (μ = 35.8, ı  = 8.52) and possess 
between 1 and 38 years of  work experience (μ = 11.82, ı  = 8.41). 
All participants have undergraduate college degrees, and 42% have 
graduate degrees. Hence the participants are representative in part 
of  the kinds of  relatively experienced and well-educated people who 
serve as professional intelligence analysts, particularly in national 
intelligence organizations. Further, all of  the participants have direct 
military or government service, and several have worked profession-
ally in military or government intelligence organizations. Hence 
the participants are also representative of  military and government 
employees who serve as professional intelligence analysts. However, 
there is some convenience to this sample, as we draw participants 
from graduate courses within the university.
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Measurement Instruments
A two-component instrument is used to measure performance as a 
dependent variable comprised of: (1) time to complete the experi-
ment task (i.e., time to identify the fictitious terrorist plot), and (2) 
accuracy of  the task (i.e., details of  the fictitious terrorist plot). This 
instrument is informed by technology-mediated laboratory experi-
ments (Nissen and Sengupta 2006), in which time and accuracy reveal 
insightful tradeoffs and results. 
For ease of  comparison, the scales for both time and accuracy mea-
surements are normalized to a 0-1 scale, with 1 being more desirable 
(i.e., faster, more accurate, respectively). All distributional and statis-
tical analyses pertain to the scaled measurements. Performance data 
are captured automatically by the ELICIT software, which serves 
as an instrumented environment for conducting experiments along 
these lines. 
Procedures
Participants are grouped into four teams of  17 and pre-assigned to 
play specific roles (e.g., as identified via pseudonyms to ensure ano-
nymity and protect identity) in the experiment. When all ELICIT 
clients have connected with the server, participants sit down at the 
appropriate workstations, are informed verbally about the nature of  
the experiment, and are asked to read a set of  instructions pertaining 
to both the experiment and the ELICIT environment. Participants 
are instructed not to reveal their pseudonyms to one another. Indeed, 
they are instructed not to talk or communicate with one another 
during the game via any mechanism outside of  the two summarized 
above (i.e., post-pull, share). 
Participants are given incentives to play the game well, as partici-
pation and performance are factored into the evaluation of  stu-
dents’ coursework. Each participant is instructed to use the Identify 
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function only once during an experiment session. Participants are 
encouraged to ask questions throughout this process. When par-
ticipants have read the instructions and have had their questions 
answered satisfactorily, they indicate via the ELICIT client that they 
are ready to begin. The experiment session begins at this point and 
ends when all players make their identification. 
Experiment Design
The experiment design reflects a 2 x 2 full factorial: two different 
organizational forms (Hierarchy, Edge) and two different knowledge 
sharing models (information only, knowledge and information) are 
examined through 16 experiment sessions with each of  the four 
teams participating in four sessions (each time with a different fac-
toid set). This reflects a standard, balanced, textbook, two-factor 
design comparing individual performance across four sessions. Such 
design is conceived to assess main effects of  the two manipulations 
and interaction effects between them. Hence the two main contrasts 
involve Edge vs. Hierarchy and knowledge sharing vs. information 
sharing. 
Table 1 presents the assignment of  teams to the different experiment 
manipulations. Participants in Group A perform only in the Edge 
mode and with information sharing only (labeled “E – I sharing” 
in the table); there is no within-subjects manipulation. Participants 
in Group D balance this manipulation, as they perform only in 
the Hierarchy mode also with information sharing only (labeled 
“H – I sharing” in the table); there is no within-subjects manipu-
lation. Participants in Groups B and C balance those in A and D. 
Participants in Group B perform twice in Hierarchy mode (labeled 
“H – K sharing” in the table) and twice in Edge mode (labeled “E – K 
sharing” in the table), with both knowledge and information sharing 
in each case; there is a within-subjects manipulation involving orga-
nizational form but not knowledge sharing. Participants in Group C 
balance this manipulation, as they perform twice in the Edge mode 
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(labeled “E – K sharing” in the table) then twice in Hierarchy mode 
(labeled “H – K sharing” in the table), with both knowledge and 
information sharing in each case; there is a within-subjects manipu-
lation involving organizational form but not knowledge sharing. We 
elaborate on these manipulations below.
Table 1. Experiment Groups and Manipulations 
Group Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 
A E – I sharing E – I sharing E – I sharing E – I sharing 
B H – K sharing H – K sharing E – K sharing E – K sharing 
C E – K sharing E – K sharing H – K sharing H – K sharing 
D H – I sharing H – I sharing H – I sharing H – I sharing 
Organizational form. The manipulation of  organizational form 
addresses Hypothesis 1 and draws from Alberts and Hayes (2003), 
who detail a contrast between two forms: (1) the Hierarchy repre-
sents the kind of  bureaucracy ubiquitous in military and government 
organizations, and (2) the Edge is noted specifically for its agility and 
appropriateness in the modern counterterrorism environment. In 
the Hierarchy organization manipulation, participants are assigned 
to play roles within a three-level, functional, hierarchical organiza-
tion as depicted in Figure 2.











Who Group                What Group                  Where Group When Group
Hierarchy Organization
An overall leader (i.e., labeled “1”) is responsible for the intelligence 
organization as a whole and has four functional subleaders (i.e., 
labeled “2,” “6,” “10,” “14”) reporting directly. Each subleader in 
turn has three analysts (e.g., labeled “3,” “4,” “5”) reporting directly 
and is responsible for one set of  details associated with the terrorist 
plot. For instance, Subleader 2 and team would be responsible for 
the who details (e.g., which terrorist organization is involved) of  the 
plot, Subleader 6 and team would be responsible for the what details 
(e.g., what the likely target is), and so forth for the where and when 
teams. Participants are shown this organization chart, told of  their 
responsibilities within the organization, and provided with a short 
description of  the hierarchy. 
In the Edge organization manipulation, there are no pre-assigned 
leaders or functional groups established in advance of  the experi-
ment. Rather, consistent with current Edge conceptualizations of  
flexible structure, the group begins without formal leaders, functional 
groups or restricted communications. Although the players are pre-
assigned to specific roles (i.e., pseudonyms) within the game, such 
various roles reflect no hierarchical or functional differences from 
one another. As with the hierarchy manipulation above, participants 
are told about this organizational arrangement and are provided 
with a short description of  the Edge as an organizational form. We 
characterize the nature of  this Edge manipulation in Figure 3.


















Knowledge sharing. The manipulation of  knowledge sharing 
models addresses Hypothesis 2 and draws from Nissen (2006), who 
details a contrast between two kinds of  sharing: (1) shared infor-
mation provides meaning and context, and (2) shared knowledge 
enables action. In terms of  operationalization, information is rep-
resented by the factoids that are distributed, analyzed and shared 
through the ELICIT interface. Factoids provide meaning and con-
text (e.g., which terrorist organization is likely to be involved, what, 
where and when it is likely to attack) for use in identifying the ficti-
tious plot, but such factoids themselves are insufficient for timely or 
correct identification; they must be integrated with a participant’s 
knowledge model of  the plot. 
Alternatively, knowledge is represented by postcards, on which partici-
pants articulate and share their best guesses at plot details (i.e., the 
who, what, where and when). Postcards enable action, in that a person 
receiving a postcard can take action by identifying the plot. This 
group has the ability to share factoids as well, hence the manipula-
tion contrasts information sharing only with sharing both informa-
tion and knowledge.
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Organizing sequences. The manipulation of  organizing 
sequences addresses Hypothesis 3 and assigns each group to orga-
nize through a different series of  forms. Each experiment session 
employs a unique factoid set. Specifically, Group A participates in 
all four sessions in the Edge organization, and Group D participates 
in the Hierarchy organization all four times. In contrast, Group B 
participates in two sessions organized as a Hierarchy followed by 
two organized as an Edge, and Group C reverses this order with 
two sessions organized as an Edge followed by two organized as a 
Hierarchy. All four groups participate using the same, four, distinct 
factoid sets in the same order, but the sequence of  organizational 
form—and hence organizational learning opportunities—varies.  
RESULTS 
We discuss the results of  our laboratory experiments in this section. 
We begin with several general observations and then turn to address 
each of  the hypotheses. The section closes with a summary of  key 
implications.
General Observations
As summarized above, we conduct experimentation through 16 ses-
sions. A total of  68 unique participants play the game and provide 
210 useful observations at the individual level of  analysis. Results 
are omitted for participants who fail to identify the terrorist plot. 
Although instructed not to, some participants submit multiple iden-
tifications. For consistency in the analysis and with the instruction set 
to the players, results reflect only the participant’s first identification, 
regardless whether subsequent identifications are more or less accu-
rate. The distribution of  these 210 observations is summarized in 
Table 2 below (i.e., Edge vs. Hierarchy, knowledge and information 
sharing (“K+I”) vs. information sharing (“I only”). 
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Table 2. Cross-tabulation of  Observations
Organization Form Total  
Edge Hierarchy  
K+I 66 62 128 
I only 46 36 82 
Total 112 98 210 
The two components of  the dependent variable performance (i.e., time 
and accuracy) are checked for normality using probability plots, 
with acceptable results, and interestingly they are not correlated 
(r = -0.058, p>0.40). Normal distribution of  and lack of  covariance 
between the dependent variables supports the appropriateness of  
utilizing ANOVA to assess the results. Coupled with the low correla-
tion between the primary manipulations (i.e., organizational form 
and knowledge sharing; 0.044, p>0.52), the normality of  distribu-
tion supports the use of  MANOVA also (Kerlinger and Lee 2000).
As summarized in Table 3, when knowledge is shared, players in the 
Edge configurations have an average time score of  0.47 (recall that 0 
would represent the slowest time for any player to identify the details 
of  the terrorist attack in any experimental round, while 1 would rep-
resent the fastest time for any player to identify details about the 
terrorist attack in any experimental round) and an average accuracy 
score of  0.75 (on a similar 0-1 scale). When knowledge is not shared, 
Edge time scores drop a bit (4%) to 0.45, but accuracy scores fall 
19% to 0.61. Hence knowledge sharing improves Edge performance 
in terms of  both time and accuracy, but the greater effect is in terms 
of  accurate identification.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Two Dimensional Performance
Organizational Form  
Edge Hierarchy    All 












K + I 
No Response 
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For the Hierarchy, the knowledge sharing results in a time score of  
0.25 and an accuracy score of  0.69. This compares with respec-
tive time and accuracy scores of  0.47 and 0.60 when knowledge is 
not shared. Interestingly, knowledge sharing causes the Hierarchy to 
perform nearly 50% more slowly than when not shared. This is oppo-
site of  the effect observed for the Edge. Alternatively, consistent with 
Edge results, knowledge sharing improves accuracy by roughly 15%.
It appears that knowledge sharing among the players slows the hier-
archy but yields greater accuracy over the case of  simply exchang-
ing information. The Edge, however, demonstrates negligible degra-
dation in time when knowledge is shared and shows a comparable 
improvement in accuracy. The Edge also outperforms the Hierarchy 
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in most cases. This is intriguing since, as noted above, nearly all 
counterterrorism intelligence organizations in the field are orga-
nized hierarchically.
Organizational Form Hypothesis
Recall how Hypothesis 1 suggests that people working together in 
an Edge organization will outperform those who perform the same 
work in a Hierarchy. Our general observations above provide some 
support for this suggestion. As summarized in the table, the mean 
time score for all players working within Edge configurations (i.e., 
regardless of  knowledge sharing) is 0.47 versus 0.33 (30% higher) 
for players working with Hierarchy configurations. This difference is 
statistically significant (p<0.001). Similarly, the mean accuracy score 
for players working within Edge configurations is 0.69 versus 0.66 
(4% higher) for players working within Hierarchy configurations, 
but this difference is statistically insignificant (p>0.38). Given these 
results, Hypothesis 1 is partially supported. Persons working in an 
Edge organization, on average, perform their work faster. However, 
persons working in Edge and Hierarchy configurations produce com-
parably accurate results. These results are independent of  knowledge 
sharing and reflect main effects.
Knowledge Sharing Hypothesis
Recall how Hypothesis 2 suggests that greater knowledge sharing 
will lead to superior performance. Our general observations above 
provide some support for this suggestion as well. As summarized in 
the table, the mean time score for participants in groups that shared 
knowledge is 0.37 versus 0.45 (22% lower). This difference is statis-
tically significant (p<0.01). Alternatively, the mean accuracy score 
for participants in groups that shared knowledge is 0.72 versus 0.61 
(15% higher). This difference is statistically significant (p<0.01) also. 
Given these results, Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. Persons 
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sharing knowledge, on average, perform their work more slowly. 
However, persons sharing knowledge produce more accurate results. 
These results imply an interesting trade space for organizational 
designers: the sharing of  knowledge results in more accurate but 
slower performance. These results are independent of  organiza-
tional form and reflect main effects.
Organizational Form and Knowledge models
Integrating data associated with both the organizational form and 
knowledge sharing hypotheses suggests that interaction effects are 
present. Recall that knowledge sharing in Edge organizations cor-
responds to slightly higher time score (0.47 vs. 0.45). This difference 
is not statistically significant (p>0.55). Alternatively, such sharing 
corresponds to significantly (p<0.02) higher accuracy score (0.75 vs. 
0.61). Hence active knowledge sharing in the Edge improves accu-
racy without slowing the counterterrorism intelligence organization 
significantly.
Results are different for the Hierarchy. Recall that knowledge shar-
ing in Hierarchy organizations corresponds to considerably lower 
time score (0.25 vs. 0.47). This difference is statistically significant 
(p<0.01). Alternatively, such sharing corresponds to significantly 
(p<0.08) higher accuracy score (0.69 vs. 0.60). Hence active knowl-
edge sharing in the Hierarchy suggests the same kind of  trade space 
noted above for organizational designers: sharing knowledge results 
in a more accurate but slower performance.
When considering these interaction effects, knowledge sharing within 
Edge organizations signals benefit without cost: accuracy improves 
with no speed degradation. With the Hierarchy, however, costs and 
benefits in terms of  speed and accuracy must be traded off  against 
one another. This suggests that the Edge organization may have a 
performance edge over the Hierarchy. Moreover, when knowledge 
is shared, the Edge is considerably faster (0.47 vs. 0.25) and more 
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accurate (0.75 vs. 0.69) than the Hierarchy is. Designers of  counter-
terrorism intelligence organizations may find it productive to con-
sider active knowledge sharing within Edge organizational forms.
Organizational Learning Hypothesis
Recall how Hypothesis 3 suggests that organizational performance 
will improve through time. This implies that time and accuracy for 
the four groups will improve across each round of  experimentation. 
Figures 4 and 5 provide contrary evidence. Looking first at Figure 
4, for instance, time scores for Groups A and D appear to hover at 
about the same level throughout the experiment, with slight deg-
radation or improvement from one round to the next. Group C 
improves, degrades, and then improves, while Group B degrades, 
improves, and improves. This does not reflect the kind of  steady per-
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 Observed Time, Groups A-D
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Accuracy scores delineated in Figure 5 suggest mixed results also. 
Scores for Groups A, B, and C improve between Rounds 1 and 2 and 
Rounds 3 and 4 but also degrade somewhat between Rounds 2 and 
3. Only Group D shows steady improvement in terms of  accuracy 
scores across the four rounds. Neither reflects the kind of  steady per-
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Key Implications
We identify several key implications of  these results. First, we find 
mixed support for the hypotheses. As summarized in Table 4, the 
results do not provide strong support for any of  the hypotheses. 
Indeed, only Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported even partially, with 
negligible support for Hypothesis 3. These results are surprising on 
the surface, for the three hypotheses are grounded in the associated 
literatures. However, closer examination elucidates the situation.
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In terms of  organizational form, the two dimensions of  our perfor-
mance measure (i.e., speed and accuracy) reflect different results. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported in terms of  speed, as the Edge groups out-
perform the Hierarchy groups significantly. Alternatively, the perfor-
mance differential in terms of  accuracy is detected but insignificant. 
For the organizational designer or manager interested in speed, the 
Edge appears to represent a superior design for the counterterrorism 
intelligence task, and it maintains a speed advantage without com-
promise in accuracy. Quick detection of  terrorist plots is important, 
and the Edge form offers potential to improve organizational perfor-
mance. This is particularly the case since nearly all counterterrorism 
intelligence organizations conform to the Hierarchy form.
Table 4. Summary of  Support for Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis Focus Support Comment 
1 Organizational Form Partially Supported 
Edge outperforms Hierarchy 
significantly with regards to 
speed but not accuracy 
2 Knowledge Sharing Partially Supported 
Knowledge sharing slows 
performance but increases 
accuracy significantly 
3 Organizational Learning Not Supported 
Erratic longitudinal 
performance over time 
In terms of  knowledge sharing, exchanging knowledge via post-
cards improves accuracy significantly, as expected, but surprisingly 
it degrades speed significantly. This highlights an important trade 
space for organizational designers and managers to consider: both 
speed and accuracy are important in the counterterrorism domain, 
but it is unclear how one should trade one performance dimension 
against the other. Is it better, for instance, to identify correctly some 
details associated with a terrorist plot quickly, even though other 
details are incorrect, or would it be better to wait for all of  the correct 
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details? The answer would depend upon individual decision makers’ 
preferences, task environments, and risk tolerance. Highlighting this 
trade space represents a contribution of  this study and indicates that 
additional research is needed to understand its implications better.
In terms of  organizational learning, the results do not support our 
hypothesis, and this is surprising. One would expect for organiza-
tional learning to occur and manifest itself  through performance 
improvement over time. The artificiality of  the experiment task and 
task environment may contribute to this result, as may the relatively 
short length of  time that participants in the four groups had to work 
and learn together. A follow-on study to address these limitations 
may elucidate the issue.
CONCLUSION 
Although the date 11 September 2001 moves progressively into the 
past, the significance of  how the terrorism events on this date trans-
formed the world remains, and life under the persistent terrorist threat 
has never been the same. One of  the key institutional responses to 
this threat is the counterterrorism intelligence organization, which 
is organized and staffed to detect and disrupt terrorism activities 
before they develop into attacks. Traditionally very hierarchical and 
bureaucratic, such organizations have been criticized broadly, but 
their organizational structures remain largely unchanged. Given 
the dynamic, experience-based, knowledge-intensive nature of  the 
counterterrorism task, Contingency Theory would suggest flatter, 
more flexible organization with knowledge sharing as a key contingency 
factor. Little is known, however, about interactions between organi-
zational design and knowledge sharing.
The research described in this article reports on systematic labo-
ratory experimentation to assess the structure of  counterterrorism 
intelligence organizations in the context of  alternate knowledge pro-
cesses and to identify promising alternate approaches to organizing. 
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Building upon Contingency Theory, we identify flexible organiza-
tional structures with potential to transform counterterrorism radi-
cally. In particular, the Edge organizational form, noted for flexibility 
and agility, is identified specifically for its potential in the counterter-
rorism domain, and a review of  the literature leads to three research 
hypotheses for testing.
The ELICIT multiplayer intelligence game provides an instru-
mented, computer-networked environment for laboratory testing. 
Developed specifically for experimentation in the counterterrorism 
domain, ELICIT requires group information sharing and problem 
solving to uncover and identify the details of  a fictitious terrorist 
plot. We construct a full-factorial research design that manipulates 
organizational form and knowledge sharing within a controlled and 
instrumented laboratory task environment.
Consistent with contingency theoretic understanding, results show 
that the flexible Edge structures have limitations as well as strengths 
and are not appropriate in all circumstances. In particular, the Edge 
organization outperforms the Hierarchy significantly in this experi-
ment with respect to speed but not accuracy. Moreover, when we 
consider both speed and accuracy together, the Edge organiza-
tion outperforms the Hierarchy when knowledge is shared. When 
knowledge is not shared, however, the Edge loses its edge over the 
Hierarchy. This elucidates a complex interaction between knowledge 
sharing and organizational design, one that suggests the contingency 
factor knowledge sharing is particularly important in a dynamic con-
text, a contingency factor that has received negligible attention to 
date in the literature. 
Results have several practical implications for organizational design-
ers and managers as well. When considering counterterrorism intel-
ligence organizations—which are predominantly hierarchical in 
nature—noteworthy performance improvements may be achiev-
able through change toward more flexible and agile edge-like forms, 
particularly where active knowledge sharing is encouraged. Further, 
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results highlight an important trade space between performance in 
terms of  speed and accuracy, as sharing knowledge improves accu-
racy but reduces speed. Organizational designers and managers 
may have to give up performance along one dimension in order to 
increase performance along one or more others.
Other topics for future research emerge naturally from this inves-
tigation. In particular, the promising Edge organizational form is 
not understood well either in theory or practice. More theoretical 
elaboration of  this form and its relationships with other forms would 
likely inform our discussion well, and empirical research to identify 
Edge organizations in practice and assess their comparative perfor-
mance strengths and weaknesses would amplify the kind of  sugges-
tive evidence found through the present study. 
Finally, drawing from the literature, we examine two, contrasting 
organizational forms through this investigation: the Hierarchy and 
Edge. However, there are clearly myriad other organizational forms 
that have been described in both theory and practice, and one or 
more of  them may be suited even better for counterterrorism intel-
ligence work than the Edge appears to be. Research to identify and 
assess the comparative potential of  such other organizational forms 
would appear to be highly relevant in light of  this investigation. 
Likewise, we understand well from Contingency Theory that no sin-
gle organizational form is best in all circumstances. There are clearly 
many contingency factors beyond those associated with this investi-
gation that may influence the relative efficacy of  Edge, Hierarchy, 
and other organizational forms in the counterterrorism intelligence 
domain. Other approaches to knowledge sharing can be explored, 
and different combinations of  tacit versus explicit knowledge shar-
ing approaches warrant investigation as important factors in organi-
zational design. 
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Given the importance of  counterterrorism intelligence work, and 
how life under the persistent terrorist threat has never been the same 
since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, future research 
along the lines of  this investigation offers potential to impact the 
lives of  many people. This places such scholarly work in a rarefied 
class of  research and suggests considerable urgency.
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